The basic Merkle-Hellman additive trapdoor knapsack public-key cryptosystem was recently shown to be insecure, and attacks have also been developed on stronger variants of it, such as the Graham-Shamir system and the iterated knapsack cryptosystem. This paper shows that some simple variants of another Merkle-Hellman system, the multiplicative knapsack cryptosystem, are insecure. It is also shown that the Shamir fast signature scheme can be broken quickly. Similar attacks can also be used to break the Scho . . bi-Massey authentication scheme. These attacks have not been rigorously proved to succeed, but heuristic arguments and empirical evidence indicate that they work on systems of practical size.
≤ c j ≤ log M).
This problem is known to be NP-complete [24] and so is presumed to be hard, at least in the worst case. (There is some empirical evidence, backed by heuristics and in some cases by theoretical analyses, which indicates that many instances of this problem may be solvable in polynomial time [6, 15] .) In order to have a usable cryptosystem, however, it is necessary that the intended user should be able to utilize it, which means that he must be able to rapidly decode messages or sign them (in a signature scheme). In order to make this possible, the designers of the systems mentioned above have built into them trapdoors, which enable the intended user to transform a seemingly very hard general knapsack problem into a very easy one. For instance, in the basic Merkle-Hellman additive knapsack system, the designer publishes n keys, a 1 ,...,a n , which are all large integers of about 2n bits each, and anyone wishing to send him a message (ε 1 ,...,ε n ), ε i = 0 or 1, computes the integer
and transmits it over a regular communication channel. An eavesdropper faces the apparently intractable problem of determining the ε i knowing only the a i and m. The recipient, however, possesses secret keys W and M such that the sequence Wa 1 ,...,Wa n , when reduced modulo M, becomes a superincreasing sequence [18] , and the transformed knapsack problem is thus very easy to solve. In other variations of this scheme, the recipient might have to perform several such modular multiplications using several sets of secret keys. In all cases, however, there is some (secret) trapdoor which allows the recipient to transform the seemingly hard knapsack problem into a very tractable one. It is this presence of trapdoors which makes some of the attacks on the additive knapsack cryptosystems feasible [2, 25] . In those attacks the cryptanalyst carries out an initial polynomial-time but relatively long precomputation which with high probability finds some trapdoor (usually not the one built into the system) which then enables him to decrypt each cyphertext about as rapidly as the intended recipient can do it. Other attacks, such as those of [15] and to some extent of [6] , do not depend on the existence of specific trapdoors, but on the public knapsack of the cryptosystem being sparse. In those attacks, decrypting each message is still a polynomial-time process for the cryptanalyst, but takes substantially longer than for the possessor of the secret keys (typically on the order of n 4 operations versus n 3 in the case of [15] ).
The trapdoor present in the Merkle-Hellman multiplicative knapsack public-key cryptosystem makes that system vulnerable to our attack. This system's design was motivated by the presumed difficulty of both the general knapsack problem and the discrete logarithm problem. Here the designer chooses n relatively prime numbers p 1 ,...,p n (which would usually be the first n primes, or else random n-bit primes) and a prime q such that
together with a primitive root b modulo q. He then finds integers a i (the discrete logarithms of 2) and publishes a 1 ,...,a n , keeping b and q secret. Anyone wishing to send him a message (ε 1 ,...,ε n ), ε i = 0 or 1, computes the integer
and transmits it. The intended receipient, knowing b and q, then computes m ≡ b k (modulo q),
and q satisfies (1.1), we have
and therefore ε i = 1 if and only if p i  m. Thus the message is easy to recover for the intended recipient. The cryptanalyst, on the other hand, faces the task of either trying to solve for the ε i knowing only the k in (1.3) and the a i , or else of trying to discover the trapdoor keys b and q.
The first of these attacks (which applies to any knapsack system) is discussed in [15] . Based on actual tests and heuristics, it appears to work in many cases. Its disadvantage is that it requires a separate run of the lattice reduction algorithm (which takes at least on the order of n 4 operations)
to attack each n-bit message. Here we discuss an attack that is likely to discover the secret keys b
and q in polynomial time with high probability, provided that the p i (or at least a large subset of them) are known to the cryptanalyst, and are not too large, so that q is O(n log n) bits long. This attack does not apply if the p i are not known, or even when they are known but their order is given by a permutation unknown to the cryptanalyst.
A typical value for n might be 100. In that case, if the p i are the initial n primes, (1.1) forces q to be on the order of 730 bits in length. If the p i are random 100-bit primes, (1.1) forces q to be on the order of 10,000 bits in length, which might be regarded as prohibitive, both from the standpoint of waste of transmission facilities and because of the difficulty of computing m. Thus the temptation might be to use only small primes p i , and for ease of implementation perhaps fixed primes all the time, which would make the system vulnerable to our attack.
The multiplicative knapsack system has another weakness which the attack presented here does not exploit. This comes from the fact that the system designer must be able to compute the discrete logarithms a i in (1.2). The discrete logarithm problem modulo a prime q is widely thought to be very hard, and the best general algorithm that is known for it, due to Western and
Miller [28] (see also [19] ) and analyzed by Adleman [1] , has running time of about exp (O( ( log q) 1 ⁄2 ( log log q) 1 ⁄2 ) ) .
However, relatively efficient algorithms are known when q − 1 is divisible only by relatively small primes [20] . Hence in the multiplicative knapsack system, q is chosen to have this property. This fact provides additional information to the cryptanalyst, which might make it possible to break the system even when the p i are not known.
The Shamir fast signature scheme [24] is similar in many ways to the basic Merkle-Hellman additive knapsack system. It was designed to make up for a significant disadvantage of the additive knapsack, namely that it could not be used for authentication. In many applications, what is required is not the ability for A to transmit to B without anyone else reading the message, but rather a way for A to send a message to B in such a way that B can be sure the message comes from A and not from anyone else. The RSA system [22] is very effective in this role, whereas the additive and multiplicative knapsack schemes are not very suitable, because only a very small fraction of the messages that can be transmitted are actually valid cyphertext messages. The Shamir scheme [24] overcomes this difficulty, and has the additional very desirable feature that it is very fast, even when implemented in software.
In the Shamir scheme with parameter n (n = 100 is suggested in [24] ), Party A, who wishes to provide electronic signatures, publishes a prime p of about n bits and 2n integers a 1 ,...,a 2n , each of about n bits. Then, in order to certify that an n-bit message (δ 1 ,...,δ n ) comes from A, A provides a signature consisting of 2n integers ε 1 ,...,ε 2n , 0 ≤ ε i ≤ n for all i, which he computes using his secret trapdoor information, such that
Any recipient of A's message can easily check whether (1.4) holds. The presumed security of this scheme stemmed from the fact that solving (1.4) for the ε j seemed hard without A's secret information. This information consists of a 0-1 matrix E = (e i j ) of size n by 2n, such that for
This matrix is constructed by choosing the e i j independently to be 0 or 1 with equal probability.
Then, with very high probability, the leading n×n submatrix of E will be nonsingular modulo the randomly chosen prime p. (One can even choose p after one chooses the matrix E so that p will not divide the determinant of the leading n×n submatrix of E.) Next, a n + 1 ,...,a 2n are chosen to be random n-bit integers, and the system (1.5), 1 ≤ i ≤ n, is solved to obtain a 1 ,...,a n .
The simplest way to form the signature (ε 1 ,...,ε 2n ) for an n-bit message (δ 1 ,...,δ n ) is to take
which by (1.5) will satisfy (1.4), and will have 0 ≤ ε j ≤ n. This procedure, however, is very insecure, because every message yields 2n linear equations for the e i j , so that after about n messages, an eavesdropper can discover the matrix E and thus can break the scheme. To circumvent this problem, Shamir proposed that to sign (δ 1 ,...,δ n ), A should first choose a random subset a i 1 ,...,a i k of the a i , form the signature (ε 1 ′ ,...,ε 2n ′ ) for the message
as above, and then form the signature (ε 1 ,...,ε 2n ) by taking ε i j = ε i j ′ + 1, 1 ≤ j ≤ k, and
This appears to sufficiently randomize the linear equations so as to make a linear algebra attack on this scheme unlikely to succeed. However, Section 4 shows that the difficulties can be overcome by using recently developed tools of diophantine approximation.
We do not reconstruct the secret matrix E. Instead, using on the order of O(n 4 ) bit operations we construct a different matrix which then allows us to sign a message using only O(n 3 ) operations.
As a comparison, we note that the secret matrix E takes on the order of n 5 bit operations to compute (using Gaussian elimination and ordinary arithmetic schemes, which are the only practical ones in the ranges of interest) even if we don't count the cost of computing random numbers, and each signature takes on the order of n 2 bit operations to generate once E is known.
The attack we describe depends on the matrix E being essentially a random 0 − 1 matrix so that a signature (ε 1 ,...,ε 2n ) is recognized as valid whenever it satisfies the congruence (1.4) and has 0 ≤ ε i ≤ n, 1 ≤ i ≤ 2n. However, it is possible to restrict attention to matrices E in which all column sums are ≤ m for some m < n, so that valid signatures have 0 ≤ ε i ≤ m. (Shamir suggested in his original proposed [24] that for n = 100, it might be best for technical reasons to take m = 63, for example.) If m is taken to be very small, say m < √  n , then the attack we describe here is expected to fail. However, such a system would still be vulnerable to an attack similar to the one described here, but directed at each message individually. In addition, each signature would then reveal a lot of information about the matrix E, which might be sufficient for the cryptanalyst to recover E. We do not pursue these approaches here, since our purpose is just to point out some of the basic weaknesses of these systems, which should be sufficient to discourage people from using them.
Recently Shamir and Tulpan [26] have developed another attack on the Shamir signature scheme. Unlike the attack prescribed here, it can be proved to succeed with high probability, but its running time is exponential in n. For n not too large, though, the running time is not very high. The case of n = 100 was tested successfully in [26] , and the authors extrapolated that even n = 500 might be doable.
Scho
. . bi and Massey [23] have proposed a knapsack-based signature scheme different from the Shamir one. Its advantage is that it can be used both for transmission of information and -8 -authentication. Its disadvantage is that the secret key is very large, and it is much slower than Shamir's. In Section 5 we briefly indicate how it can be attacked by methods similar to those used for breaking the multiplicative knapsack system and the Shamir scheme.
As is the case with the other attacks [2, 6, 15, 25] on the additive knapsack schemes, we cannot prove that our attacks always succeed. In fact, while attacks on the basic Merkle-Hellman additive knapsack cryptosystem can be shown to succeed most of the time [14, 25] , we cannot prove even that for our attacks. The main reason is that we rely on the Lenstra, Lenstra, and Lova ´ sz lattice basis reduction algorithm [17] satisfying certain conditions (at least on average) which it has not been proved to possess. However, extensive numerical experiments by Brickell [8] and the author show that the algorithm often does satisfy those conditions (which are discussed in Section 2). Extrapolation from these numerical experiments indicate that our attack on the Shamir scheme, for example, ought to be successful for n up to at least 1000.
In Section 2, we discuss briefly the lattice basis reduction algorithm which is the basic tool of our attacks, as well as other algorithms that could possibly be used in its place. Sections 3 and 4 present the cryptanalysis of the multiplicative knapsack system and the Shamir fast signature scheme, respectively. Section 4 also describes successful attempts to break the Shamir scheme using the approach presented there. Finally, in Section 5 we briefly discuss attacks on the Scho . . bi-Massey scheme.
Lattice basis reduction algorithm
The initial attack on the additive knapsack cryptosystems by Shamir relied on H. W. Lenstra's polynomial time algorithm for the integer programming problem when the number of variables is fixed [16] . Since then, this algorithm has been largely superseded in cryptographic applications by the Lenstra, Lenstra, and Lova ´ sz lattice reduction algorithm [17] , (which we will refer to as the L 3 algoritm), which is easy to program and whose running time is polynomial in the total size of the problem. It was first applied in cryptography by Adleman [2] .
Given n vectors v _ 1 ,...,v _ n ∈ Z n , the lattice L spanned by them is the collection of all integer linear combinations
Many problems in computational complexity, number theory, and cryptography can be reduced to the problem of finding the shortest vector in a lattice. In many cases, it suffices just to find some short vector in a lattice. The L 3 algorithm [17] does find a fairly short vector. To be precise,
given a basis v _ 1 ,...,v _ n for a lattice L, the algorithm produces another basis w _ _ 1 ,...,w _ _ n for L that Lenstra, Lenstra, and Lova ´ sz call reduced. We do not need the precise definition, but it can be shown [17] that the shortest vector in the reduced basis is relatively short:
where L ′ = L \ {( 0 ,..., 0 ) }, and
is the euclidean norm of a vector. Furthermore, the other vectors of the reduced lattice basis tend to be short also. The running time of the original algorithm was shown to be O(n 6 ( log B)
where B is an upper bound for the coordinates of the initial basis v _ 1 ,...,v _ n , and slightly faster variants have been proposed [12] .
What is perhaps most striking about the L 3 algorithm is that it performs much better in practice than it is guaranteed to. Very extensive tests by Brickell [8] and independently by the author (up to dimension 102) show that in most cases the reduced basis vectors are very short, in fact much shorter than the worst case bound (2.1) guarantees. Some of the computational results are described in greater detail in [15] . The assumption underlying our attacks is that when the L -10 -algorithm is applied to the lattices that arise in our problems (which are of a somewhat special nature), it will in a substantial fraction of the cases find reduced bases in which the shortest vector is at most a constant factor longer than the shortest vector in the lattice, and that the next few shortest vectors in the reduced basis are also short. This assumption is fully supported by the experiments that have been carried out so far, in dimensions up to around 100. This is sufficient for our attack on the Shamir scheme, for example, with parameter n < ∼ 500.
There are some indications that in higher dimensions the performance of the L 3 algorithm might deteriorate. For example, the numerical evidence seems to imply that the ratio of the product of the lengths of the vectors in a reduced basis produced by the L 3 algorithm to the determinant of the lattice grows roughly like exp (cn 2 ) for some small constant c. Except for the value of c, this is similar to the worst case bound of [17] . On the other hand, by reasoning in analogy with the reduction theory of quadratic forms [9; pp. 259-263] we might expect that for most lattices there would be some reduced basis for which the above ratio grows only as exp (c ′ n log n). Thus it is quite possible that our attacks might fail in very high dimension, say on the order of several hundred. Such high dimensions, though, would be required in the case of the Shamir signature scheme (for example) only when the parameter size n in that scheme (which is about 2 log 2 n times larger than the dimension of the lattice that is used in the cryptanalysis) is on the order of several thousand, which makes that scheme impractical. Furthermore, as new diophantine approximation algorithms are developed, the range of applicability of our attacks can be expected to increase.
It is possible to significantly speed up the L 3 algorithm by performing some of the crucial multiprecision operations in floating point arithmetic. The rigorous analysis of [17] then no longer applies, but since all operations on basis elements are still carried out in integers, at the end of the computation it is easy to check that the basis is in fact reduced. The running time of this modified algorithm, assuming that roundoff errors do not cause it to make incorrect decisions, can be shown to be O(n 4 ( log B) 3 ). In practice, the running time seems to be much shorter, perhaps on the order of n ( log B) 3 or so. Present computational experience with lattices in dimensions up to 102 indicates that even a relatively inefficient high-level language implementation of the modified algorithm on a high-speed machine such as the CRAY-1 can find a reduced basis for a typical 50-dimensional lattice given in terms of 100-bit coordinates in a few minutes.
We use the L 3 algorithm primarily because its basic version is the only one in this area which is guaranteed to produce reasonably short vectors in a lattice in polynomial time. It is quite possible that other algorithms, such as those of [4, 5, 10, 11, 21, 27] , or modifications of them, could perform just as well or better in practice on typical lattices. Therefore the running time bounds that we quote should be regarded as provisional, and capable of substantial improvement.
Multiplicative knapsack
In this section we present an attack on the multiplicative knapsack cryptosystem. We assume that integers a 1 ,...,a n are known and at least some of the primes (or relatively prime numbers) p 1 ,...,p n are known, and we try to find the unknown integer b and prime q such that
We assume that b, q, and the a i are of about m bits; if the p i are the first n primes, then m ∼ n log 2 n, and if the p i are n-bit primes, then m > ∼ n 2 , since we must have q > ∼ Π p i . Our attack will take polynomial time only if m = O(n log n).
The basic idea behind the attack is to find a collection of vectors δ _ = (δ 1 ,...,δ n ) such that 2) and such that the δ i are not too large. (If not all the p i are known, then we also require that δ i = 0 for those i for which p i is not known.) By (3.1), each such vector δ _ gives a congruence of the form
where
But then
If we compute several of the u(δ _) − v(δ _), then their greatest common divisor is likely to be q.
Once we have found q, it is easy us to compute b. We find a solution δ _ to
(with δ i = 0 for those i for which p i is not known, again) and then compute
Since q is already known, we do not require the δ i in (3.5) to be small in order to compute b efficiently. In some cases it may be impossible to find a solution to (3.5), but that can happen only if gcd(a 1 ,...,a n ) = d > 1, in which case we might as well work with b d and a 1 / d,. ..,a n / d.
In most cases, however, even the first few of the a i should be relatively prime, so there will be no difficulty.
We now consider this approach in detail. Vectors δ _ that satisfy (3.2) are easy to find in general. The difficulty is in finding δ _ that satisfy (3.2) with small δ i . There are several ways to use the L 3 algorithm to find solutions to (3.2) with small δ i . We pick a subset of k a i 's for which the p i are known. By renumbering the a i and p i , we can assume that we are dealing with a 1 ,...,a k and p 1 ,...,p k . We next apply the L 3 algorithm to the lattice L spanned by the k + 1
(In actual implementations one would replace 2 m by a smaller power of 2, but we will not worry about such details here.) Note that any vector in L is given by
for some δ 1 ,...,δ k , d ∈ Z. For a vector to be short, its last coordinate has to be zero, and the δ i should all be small. This can only happen if d = 0 and Σ δ i a i = 0, since if d ≠ 0, some of the δ i would have to be very large, which would make the vector long.
To determine how short the vectors in the reduced basis might be, we apply the pigeon-hole principle. Consider the integers
They are all < ∼ kB2 m in absolute magnitude, and so if their total number, (B + 1 ) k , exceeds kB2 m (which occurs for B ∼ ∼ 2 m /(k − 1 ) ), two of them will have to be equal, and so we obtain an equation
of the form
In fact, it is easy to show that many such equations have to be satisfied. Therefore we can expect that there are many vectors in our lattice of length < ∼ √  k 2 m /(k − 1 ) . The basic unproved assumption underlying our attack is that the L 3 algorithm will find such vectors.
We next consider the running time of the algorithm. The 
bit operations. If m ∼ n log 2 n (when the p i are the initial n primes, for example), and if we choose k = n, this results in about n 6 bit operations. However, if the p i are n-bit primes, We first find solutions to
where the ε i are to be small but not identically zero. Initially, we work with only a subset of the a i , which without loss of generality we may take to be a 1 ,...,a k .
By the pigeon-hole principle, a solution to
with ε i  ≤ B is guaranteed to exist approximately when B > ∼ 2 n /(k − 1 ) . Each such solution will of course give a solution to 
and so is short only when the ε i are small and
that is, when we have a solution to (4.4). Our assumption, supported by empirical evidence, is that when the LLL algorithm is applied to a basis of the form (4.5), it will find a reduced basis w _ _ 1 * ,...,w k + 1 * such that the first coordinate of each of w _ _ 1 * ,...,w _ _ k * is equal to 0, and the other coordinates are < ∼ 2 n /(k − 1 ) in absolute magnitude.
Once the reduced basis w _ _ 1 * ,...,w _ _ k + 1 * has been found with the above properties, vectors v We next select x ∈ Z such that
Using the precomputed inverse of the matrix of the v _ i , we express
(Since we only need to know the c i to within ± 1/10, say, the inverse of the matrix can be computed in floating point arithmetic.) We then form
where ( (t) ) denotes the integer nearest to t. We expect the c i − ( (c i ) ) to behave like independent random variables distributed uniformly on [ − 1/2 , 1/2 ], and so we expect the coordinates of y _ on average to be about < ∼ B(k /12 ) 1 ⁄2 in absolute magnitude. Hence we can expect that the
is sufficiently much smaller than n, and we will -17 -
which gives the desired signature.
The computational complexity of this attack and the allowable choices for k are easy to evaluate. The LLL algorithm takes on the order of k 4 n 3 bit operations. We are constrained by the fact that we need to have B√  k < ∼ n (actually, < ∼ n( log n)
. If we choose k slightly larger than 2n /( log 2 n), the constraints will be satisfied, and the running time of the initial preprocessing stage will be on the order of n 4 . Once the initial stage is completed,
any signature takes about n 3 bit operations to generate.
The above attack might occasionally fail because some coefficient
In that case, we can either try to correct this problem by adding some combination of the v _ i , or else can try again with a different set of d i 's. In any case, this problem is unlikely to arise, at least in the basic Shamir signature scheme described here. If the matrix E is chosen so that its column sums are all ≤ m < n, so that valid signatures have 0 ≤ ε i ≤ m, it might be necessary to choose k larger than 2n /( log 2 n), since we need Bk 1/2 m − 1 to be quite small.
The attack presented above on the basic Shamir scheme was implemented using the Vaxima symbolic manipulation system. It was tested on about half a dozen sets of keys that were generated using n = 30 and p = 2 31 − 1. The basic stage was carried out using k = 12 and r = 10. In about 200 examples, the absolute values of coordinates of the y _ vector were always ≤ 7, and were ≤ 5 most of the time. Several sets of keys with n = 50 and p = 669369903482281 were also tested using k = 16 and r = 14. In over 50 examples, the absolute values of the coordinates of the y _ vector were usually ≤ 7, although once a coefficient of
The Schobi-Massey scheme
This scheme [23] is a modification of the iterated Merkle-Hellman additive knapsack cryptosystem. The designer publishes keys a 1 ,..., a n , derived from the usual iterated system, which can be used to transmit n-bit messages to him (or her). To sign a message m (which we can again regard as an integer in the range 0 ≤ m ≤ and the x i are not too large in absolute value. The construction of the x i is quite complicated, and
we will not present it here. In their paper, Scho . . bi and Massey [23] suggest the use of a triply iterated knapsack with n = 200, in which case the x i might satisfy x i  ≤ 100, say.
Our attack on the Scho . . bi-Massey signature scheme is very similar to those on the multiplicative knapsack and on Shamir's scheme, so we only briefly sketch it. Given a message m, to forge a signature we select x k + 1 ,..., x n at random in the allowed range, and attempt to compute x 1 ,..., x k so that the x i are small and (5. corresponding to solutions of (5.1) with small x 1 ,..., x k will be short, and we expect that the L 3 algorithm will find them.
